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This paper analyzes how the aging labor force a⁄ects the unem-
ployment rate at the regional level in Germany. A theoretical model
of equilibrium unemployment with spatial labor market interactions is
used to study the e⁄ects of age-related changes in job creation and job
destruction. Using data for 343 districts, we then examine empirically
the consequences of an aging labor force for the local labor markets in
Germany. We apply di⁄erent estimation techniques to a spatial and
time dynamic panel data model. According to the estimates, aging
causes an increase in job destruction. In addition, aging in the local
labor market increases job creation, while the spatial aging e⁄ect on
job creation in the local district is negative.
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11 Introduction
Does population aging and, hence, the aging of the labor force a⁄ect the
labor market and, ultimately, unemployment? In other words, do birth co-
horts; e.g., baby boomer and baby buster, di⁄er from each other in their
employment relevant attributes apart from cohort size? Although popu-
lation aging is a well-known fact, the e⁄ects of aging on employment and
unemployment are not fully discovered. This paper analyzes the impact
of an aging workforce on job creation, job destruction, and on equilibrium
unemployment in regional labor markets with spatial interactions.
Even in the labor market, sizeable di⁄erences in the size of birth co-
horts (e.g., baby boomer vs. baby buster) are visible in many industrialized
countries. For example, during the 1980s and 90s, the ratio of young to old
people in the labor force (here between 15 and 39 years old to those between
40 and 64 years old) declined from 1.8 to 1.1 in Canada, from 1.2 to 0.9 in
Germany, from 1.3 to 0.9 in Japan and from 1.6 to 1.1 in the USA. Within
countries, however, large di⁄erences at the regional level exist as well. For
example, using German data from 2000 and 2001 at the district level (343
regions), we ￿nd a range of 1.5 to 0.6 for the ratio of young to old workers.
In most cases, the literature dealing with age and employment or match-
ing is related to speci￿c issues. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) and
Burgess (1993) ￿nd evidence for Great Britain that the rates of job sep-
aration are higher for young workers because a higher proportion of them
conduct on-the-job searches.1 Hence, matching may decrease with an older
working population as Coles and Smith (1996) argue in their study for Eng-
land and Wales. Job separations and low hiring rates for older workers could
be the result of age discrimination (Johnson and Neumark 1997, Charness
and Villeval 2007) and pretended or actual productivity di⁄erentials (Halti-
wanger et al. 1999, Daniel and Heywood 2007). Productivity may increase
with age if job experience is important (Autor et al., 2003) or decline if
human capital depreciates over a lifetime, particularly due to technological
change or a loss of manual abilities (Bartel and Sicherman 1993, Hellerstein
et al., 1999, B￿rsch-Supan 2003).
Employment e⁄ects may also stem from di⁄erences between the age-
earning pro￿le and the age-productivity pro￿le, for which Lazear (1979) and
Hutchens (1987, 1989) provide empirical evidence. According to these ￿nd-
ings, earnings increase with age more than productivity grows. Firms receive
bene￿ts from this productivity-wage di⁄erential if employees are young, but
the bene￿ts reduce with their age and might even become negative. Con-
sequently, ￿rms may opt to get rid of their older employees, and aging of
the labor force may be the reason for an increase in the total number of
1Davis et al. (1996) ￿nd evidence for the US that job ￿ ows are higher for young
workers.
2dismissals.
The willingness to create new jobs is expected to change not only be-
cause of variations in the cohort sizes and average labor productivity, but
also because of expected changes in mobility in an aging labor force. Accord-
ing to Br￿cker and Tr￿bswetter (2007) and Hunt (2000), regional mobility
decreases as age increases. This applies to high- and low-skilled workers as
well as for employed and unemployed people. The causes for this decreas-
ing mobility after a certain point in life are, for example, housing tenure,
partner￿ s economic status, and childcare.2
Another important issue in the context of mobility is that of spatial
dependencies of the regional labor markets. The performance of a local labor
market depends, among other things, on the characteristics of the regional
labor markets in the surrounding area. For example, job creation can be
a⁄ected in di⁄erent ways depending on the age structure of the labor force
in the neighbor districts, since age-related regional mobility exhibits strong
distinctions. Although it seems obvious that regional mobility plays an
important role at the regional level, only a few studies consider spatial labor
market interactions. Fahr and Sunde (2005) use data at the regional level
for West Germany and estimate a matching function. They allow for spatial
mobility of the unemployed but do not consider spatial interaction in job
creation. Their results indicate that matching is positively related to young
participants in the labor market. Hujer et al. (2007) extend this approach
and allow for spatial dependencies of unemployed and vacancies in their
matching function. However, in contrast to Fahr and Sunde (2005), they
focus exclusively on active labor market program participants. According to
their results, an increase in unemployment in the surrounding areas increases
matching in the local region, while the opposite is true for the vacancies.
Hence, age-related productivity, separation, mobility, and spatial labor
market interactions can a⁄ect the matching equilibrium of local labor mar-
kets in di⁄erent ways. From this, it follows that a de￿nite conclusion con-
cerning the e⁄ects of aging on unemployment is very di¢ cult. A simple
way to estimate the e⁄ects of the age structure on unemployment is the
shift-share approach. An example is Shimer (1998), who attributes changes
in US unemployment to variations in the population shares of age groups
with low and high age-speci￿c unemployment rates. However, this approach
does not consider age-related changes in labor demand. Shimer (2001) and
Nordstr￿m Skans (2005) estimate the impact of changes in the population
share of the young (age 16 to 24) on unemployment. In their analysis of US
and Swedish local labor markets, respectively, they ￿nd that unemployment
tends to be lower if many young people supply labor. Shimer (2001) argues
that a high proportion of young workers is an incentive for ￿rms to create
new jobs because younger workers undertake more search activities, which
2See, for example, Lindley et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion of these causes.
3reduce the recruitment costs for ￿rms. The paper most closely related to
this is Hetze and Ochsen (2006), who extend the standard Pissarides (2000)
model of equilibrium unemployment by two age groups. To capture the de-
mographic e⁄ects empirically, they estimate both the Beveridge curve and
the job creation curve using aggregate data for 12 OECD countries. They
￿nd, for example, that an aging labor force may cause a rise in unemploy-
ment in Germany, while the US experienced positive employment e⁄ects
from an increase in the share of workers age 40 and older.
The following analysis, undertaken to identify the demographic e⁄ects on
equilibrium unemployment, provides theoretical implications and empirical
￿ndings for the German labor market. First, we extend the standard model
of equilibrium unemployment by on-the-job search, two age groups, and
regional labor market interactions. Age-related e⁄ects are introduced with
the consideration of an assumed productivity di⁄erential between the two
groups and with age-speci￿c separation risks. Spatial interactions between
neighborhood regions are implemented in such a way that it a⁄ects both job
creation and job destruction in the local region. The matching equilibrium
results in four di⁄erent labor market regimes of an aging labor force with
di⁄erent combinations of changes in the Beveridge curve and job creation.
Only in two regimes is the demographic impact on unemployment clear-
cut. Because of spatial interactions, aging in the surrounding regions can
exacerbate or mitigate the e⁄ects that emerge within a local region.
Using data for 343 districts, we then examine empirically the conse-
quences of an aging labor force for the local labor markets in Germany. We
estimate both the Beveridge curve and the job creation curve, applying dif-
ferent estimation techniques to a spatial and time dynamic panel data model
(including an estimator as suggested by Lee and Yu (2007)). The data used
are monthly and cover the years 2000 and 2001. We use ￿rm-level data and
aggregate them to the regional level, and combine them with regional data
provided by the Federal Statistical O¢ ce. According to the estimates, ongo-
ing aging in the local labor market will cause an increase in job destruction.
In addition, aging in the local labor market increases job creation, while
aging in the surrounding areas has a negative e⁄ect on job creation in the
local district, which is larger in magnitude. Hence, the results imply that
unemployment further increases when the share of younger job seekers con-
tinuously decreases in the local and the surrounding areas. This applies in
particular to the Eastern German regions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we model
equilibrium unemployment under the assumption of on-the-job search, age-
related heterogeneity in the labor force, and spatial interactive labor mar-
kets. Section 3 presents the econometric model and reports the estimation
results. Finally, we summarize our results in section 4.
42 Theoretical Model
The modeling of search and equilibrium unemployment in this section in-
cludes a simpli￿ed consideration of on-the-job search. In addition, we in-
troduce aging of the labor force and spatial dependencies of regional labor
markets in the theoretical framework. With respect to spatial dependencies,
this is the ￿rst paper to consider spatial interactions in an equilibrium un-
employment model. In contrast to Fahr and Sunde (2005) and Hujer et al.
(2007), our underlying matching function allows for on-the-job search. The
modality of introducing spatial dependencies allows for movements both of
and along the Beveridge curve.
To retain simplicity, we introduce on-the-job search di⁄erently from the
standard framework (see Pissarides, 2000). First, we do not consider the two
usual reservation productivity parameters that allow di⁄erentiation between
productivity related job destruction and on-the-job search. In general, this
helps to explain why employed people decide in favor of on-the-job search.
The focus in this paper, however, is on the consequences of spatial search
activities on job creation and job destruction. Second, we neglect search
costs for on-the-job seekers. On the one hand, we expect that they are
su¢ ciently small, and thus negligible. On the other hand, the standard
on-the-job search model does not consider search costs for the unemployed,
which seems to be somewhat unrealistic when regional mobility is considered.
Instead, to introduce these costs for both, we neglect them in the theoretical
part of the paper. Search costs are not crucial for the general conclusions
in this paper. Moreover, from an empirical perspective, we are unable to
consider search costs.
With respect to aging of the labor force, we follow the modeling of Hetze
and Ochsen (2006) and extend the framework of search and equilibrium
unemployment with the distinction between younger and older workers, and
age-related e⁄ects on job creation and job destruction.3 The standard model
implies that regions with an older labor force will have lower unemployment
rates. This is due to the simple assumption that young workers are born
into unemployment. In contrast to this, we ignore "births" and "deaths"
in the labor market, but analyze the e⁄ects on equilibrium unemployment
if younger and older workers di⁄er in some individual characteristics. From
this, it follows that changes in the age structure can have ambiguous e⁄ects
on unemployment. We di⁄erentiate between younger and older workers who
may generate di⁄erent levels of surplus for ￿rms if they ￿ll a vacancy, by
considering age-sensitive di⁄erentials in labor productivity, separation risks,
3We analyze the e⁄ects of aging of the labor force but ignore the e⁄ects of a population
decline. The reason for this is that most empirical studies ￿nd constant returns to scale of
matching functions. Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) provide an overview of the related
literature. Therefore, the pure population size has no e⁄ect on matching and search
equilibrium in the labor market.
5wages, and mobility. The purpose of the environment is to be general enough
to catch the di⁄erent ways in which shifts in the age composition can a⁄ect
equilibrium unemployment via job creation and job destruction. Due to the
generality, we can apply our theoretical results to an econometric model in
section 3 to analyze how aging a⁄ects unemployment.
This study considers two types of agents, workers and ￿rms. All agents
are risk neutral and discount the future at rate r. From the individual
attributes, i, of workers, we consider age as the only relevant factor here.
The labor force is divided into two age groups, which have a share of p and
(1 ￿ p) respectively, henceforth identi￿ed as the younger workers, y, and the
older workers, o. Workers are either employed or unemployed, in which case,
they seek a new job. The average rate of unemployment u in a continuum
of workers, normalized to 1, then consists of the age-speci￿c rates weighted
at the relevant population share, u = puy + (1 ￿ p)uo.4
Search frictions limit the matching of job seekers and vacancies. New
employment relations are created through a matching technology, which
forms the number of matches from the number of unemployed workers, the
number of on-the-job searchers, and the number of vacancies. That is, the
standard matching technology is enlarged by a rate e of the employed, who
search on-the-job for new employment. Hence, m = m(u + e;v) is the ￿ ow
rate of matches formed, with v denoting the vacancy rate.5
Equilibrium in search models usually depends on the tightness of the
labor market de￿ned as ￿ = v=(u + e), because ￿ determines how suc-
cessful search is. A ￿rm with a vacancy meets a job seeker at a rate
q(￿) = m(u + e;v)=v, thus decreasing with the vacancy-unemployment ra-
tio. A job seeker ￿nds a new employment at rate ￿q(￿), which is identical
for both age groups, as advertised vacancies do not di⁄erentiate between
younger and older candidates. That is, it is assumed that the matching
technology is random in the sense that if the proportion of younger people
in the labor force is p, then the conditional probability that a vacancy is
￿lled with a younger worker is p as well.
The job ￿nding rate ￿q(￿) is related to a closed labor market. At the
regional level, however, it is obvious that people apply for jobs in surrounding
regions. According to the Federal O¢ ce for Civil Engineering and Regional
Development in Germany, about 55% of employed people commute between
the home region and the workplace region. In addition, the bulk of these
commuting dependencies applies to regions that share the same border. To
maintain the model￿ s simplicity, we consider matching relevant job seekers
and vacancies only from the local region l and those regions that share
4Let L denote the labor force and Ly and Lo represent the respective age-related size













L = puy + (1 ￿ p)uo.
5As standard, m(u + e;v) exhibits constant returns to scale in its arguments, is con-
tinuous and di⁄erentiable, and m(u + e;v) < 1.
6the same border with the local region. In addition, we treat the neighbor
regions as one homogenous region, n. Now, the local labor market tightness
is given by ￿l = vl=
￿
ul + el + un + en￿
, and the neighbor district labor
market tightness is equal to ￿n = vn=
￿
un + en + ul + el￿
.
To consider the age-related mobility di⁄erences we pose the following
argument. Every job seeker applies for jobs in the home region, but the
number of regional mobile job applicants depends on the age structure of
the job seekers. That is, a local ￿rm with a vacancy meets a job seeker at a
rate ql ￿
￿l;pn￿
, with @ql=@pn > 0. This means that for a given number of job
seekers in region l and n, it will be easier for local ￿rms to ￿nd an appropriate
applicant if a higher number of younger job searchers are in the surrounding
labor market, n. From the perspective of the local labor market, a job seeker





Job-worker matches have a ￿nite time horizon. Separation occurs be-
cause of idiosyncratic shocks that hit all matches at the same probability s.
In addition to this, age-related shocks are possible. Let ￿o and ￿y denote
the rates which indicate the added risk that the match ends as the worker is
older or younger. The rates may also include di⁄erent quitting rates (labor
turnover rates) because of, for example, di⁄erences in regional mobility.6 Fi-
nally, from the perspective of the local region, we must add the probability
that a mobile worker loses his job in the surrounding area, ￿(s + ￿i). Here,
￿ is the share of mobile workers employed in the neighbor district, n.
The unemployment rates of younger and older workers evolve according
to job creation and job destruction, with i = [y;o]:
_ ul


















The ￿rst term on the right-hand side is the age-related ￿ ow into unem-
ployment from a local employment. The second term comprises the age-
related ￿ ow into local unemployment from jobs in the neighbor region, n.
To simplify the conclusions, we assume that separation rates are equal in
the local and neighbor region. The third and fourth terms are the transition
probabilities into a new job in the local and neighbor labor market.
From _ ui = 0 it follows that the age-speci￿c rate of equilibrium unem-
ployment in the local labor market is
ul
i =
(1 + ￿)(s + ￿i) ￿ ￿(s + ￿i)un
i





6According to the Federal Employment O¢ ce in Germany, younger job seekers exhibit
higher regional labor market mobility than older people. However, the di⁄erence is lager
for the unemployed than for on-the-job seekers.
7The summation of the two unemployment rates weighted at the respec-
tive local population proportions, pl and (1￿pl), then yields the local Bev-
eridge curve (BC)
ul =
(1 + ￿)(s + ￿o) ￿ ￿(s + ￿o)un
o










This is the local BC plus spatial and aging e⁄ects. The local age-related
e⁄ect in the ￿rst term on the right hand side disappears if the separation
rate is identical for younger and older workers. Otherwise, an increasing
proportion of the age group with the higher separation rate increases job
destruction and unemployment. The second term on the fraction stroke
means that the positive ￿ ow of newly unemployed from the surrounding re-
gion decreases the higher the unemployment rate in this region. This spatial
e⁄ect disappears if the interregional ￿ ows cancel each other out. The pro-
portion of older and younger workers in both the local and the surrounding
labor market is of importance for the local unemployment rate. However,
the spatial aging e⁄ect is hidden in the local reemployment probability ql.
The second term in eq. (2) is the direct e⁄ect of local labor force aging
via age-speci￿c unemployment rates. Finally, the unknown ￿￿ s in BC deter-
mine equilibrium unemployment, and they are explained by the willingness
of ￿rms to create vacancies.
The number of vacancies depends on the decisions made by ￿rms. A
￿rm can be in one of the three states: It is inactive at zero return, it seeks a
worker at search costs, or it hires one worker, starts production, and earns
a pro￿t. Vacancies are open equally to younger and older workers. That
is to say, we do not consider age discrimination in conjunction with the
advertisement of a vacancy.
Whether local ￿rms create new jobs or remain inactive is subject to
the bene￿ts they receive and the costs they must pay during their market
activities. The bene￿ts and costs include the (present-discounted) value of
the states: Match with an older worker Jo, match with a younger worker
Jy, and un￿lled vacancy V . The values satisfy the Bellman equations
rJo = ￿ ￿ wo ￿ (s + ￿o)(Jo ￿ V ), (3)
rJy = ￿ + ￿ ￿ wy ￿ (s + ￿y)(Jy ￿ V ), (4)




(V ￿ J). (5)
Firms receive revenues ￿ from selling the output if an older worker is em-
ployed, while they pay the wage wo as compensation. The younger worker
produces the value ￿+￿ and earns wy. Experience and lower training costs
favor older workers but a lower depreciation of human capital is an argument
for the higher productivity of younger workers. Hence, we do not ￿x the sign
8of the output di⁄erential, so that ￿ R 0.7 The job-worker match ends at the
probability s + ￿i, in which case the value of the match is replaced by the
value of an un￿lled vacancy.
The vacant job costs ￿ per unit time and changes state according to the
Poisson Process at rate ql ￿
￿l;pn￿
. Hence, given that younger workers are
favored, an increase in the share of younger workers in the surrounding area
increases the number of vacancies in the local labor market. The change of
state yields net return J ￿V , with J denoting the expected value of a ￿lled
vacancy. As the ￿rm can meet two types of workers, we consider that the
worker is younger at probability p, and he is older at probability (1 ￿ p). The
share, p, is the proportion of younger people in the labor force of the con-
sidered regions; that is, the local and the surrounding area. Since regional
mobility a⁄ects p positively, it is underestimated in this de￿nition. How-
ever, in the empirical part of the paper we cannot control for the mobility
corrected age distribution. Therefore, we ignore that aspect here.
Local and spatial age-related supply e⁄ects are considered in p, and the
expected value of ￿lling the vacancy is
J = pJy + (1 ￿ p)Jo. (6)
As revenues exceed costs in any case, a job-worker match is always more
pro￿table than a vacant job. However, workers have an impact on the equi-
librium outcome through their roles in wage determination. The employ-
ment of an older or a younger worker is expected to provide di⁄erent returns
to the ￿rms. Hence, employment should be related to di⁄erent income for
the two types of workers, wo and wy.
The unemployed job seekers receive some real return, b, which is usually
an unemployment bene￿t. As these payments have no age-sensitive elements
in Germany, we assume the same rate, b, for older and younger job seekers.
Let U and W denote the present-discounted value of the expected income
stream of an unemployed and an employed worker, respectively. The un-
employed get bene￿ts, b and in unit time, they can expect to move into
employment at the probability ￿lql + ￿nqn. In this case, they gain W but
lose U. On average, the chance to ￿nd employment is equal for older and
younger workers, as ￿rms do not advertise age-segregated vacant jobs.
The permanent income of employed workers is di⁄erent from the constant
wage as the match ends for an individual at probability s+￿i and the status
changes from W to U.8 Hence, age-related individuals can expect bene￿ts
7See B￿rsch-Supan (2003) and Hutchins (2001) on the di¢ culty of the measurement
of individual age-related productivity.
8As mentioned in the beginning of this section, we do not consider on-the-job search
costs. This is because search costs are not crucial for the general conclusions in this paper.
One way to introduce these costs would be to allow for search costs in the case of spatial
search of both the employed and unemployed. However, the results are very intuitive,
because this reduces spatial mobility.
9from labor supply which satisfy










(Wi ￿ Ui) (7)
during job search as unemployed and
rWi = wi + (s + ￿i)(Ui ￿ Wi) (8)
if they are employed. We do not di⁄erentiate between employed who search
for a new job and those who do not. The di⁄erences between wo and wy
re￿ ect that older and younger workers can be of di⁄erent value for a ￿rm.




a⁄ect the probability of a
change of state towards unemployment and consequently, the expected val-
ues of Wi and Ui.9
2.1 Equilibrium
We now must determine the market tightness in the local region and, hence,
equilibrium job creation. This is necessary to derive a conclusion from a
change in the age structure of the labor force on equilibrium unemployment.
To do this, we ￿rst need to determine wages and the pooling condition. Wage
determination must specify the labor costs so that ￿rms can evaluate the
actual value of ￿lling a vacancy. The pooling condition satis￿es that vacant
jobs do not distinguish between older and younger workers.
Wages are derived from the Nash bargaining solution (for details, see
the Appendix). While the worker gains Wi but loses Ui if she starts a
new job from unemployment, the ￿rm gives up V for J. The share of the
total bene￿ts each party receives depends on a measure ￿, which is usually
interpreted as the bargaining power of the workers:
wo =





















Employed workers receive pay between income during job search (b) if ￿ = 0
and the total revenues generated by the employment (￿;￿ + ￿) if ￿ = 1.
Values of ￿ between zero and unity consider a twofold e⁄ect of a higher
probability of reemployment ￿lql (￿) + ￿nqn (￿). First, the lower bound of
bargaining outcome increases with ￿lql (￿) + ￿nqn (￿) because it is easier to
9As usual, we assume that wi > b and workers do not give up their jobs due to a
higher alternative income.
10￿nd another vacant job and the threat level that the application for a job is
rejected is lower. Second, the upper bound decreases with ￿lql (￿) + ￿nqn (￿)
because ￿rms must wait longer until they can ￿ll a vacant job. This reduces
the total bene￿ts from market activities that can be shared among ￿rms and
workers.
While a vacant job generates zero revenue (V = 0), the ￿lled vacancy
has a positive value for a ￿rm. In consideration of the age-related wages, it
then follows from eq. (3) and eq. (4) that the value of employing an older
worker is
Jo =
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ b)
r + s + ￿o + ￿
￿
￿lql (￿) + ￿nqn (￿)
￿, (11)
whereas the younger worker generates a value of
Jy =
(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + ￿ ￿ b)
r + s + ￿y + ￿
￿
￿lql (￿) + ￿nqn (￿)
￿. (12)
The dissimilarity in the equations implies that ￿rms may prefer to meet a
younger or an older job seeker if they have a vacant job. One age group
can have a higher productivity-wage ratio or a lower quitting rate so that it
is more valuable to hire workers from this age group. However, ￿rms also
know that the search will continue and cause further costs if they refuse
a job candidate. The candidates are stochastically drawn from the pool
of job seekers and are younger at probability p and older at probability
(1 ￿ p). If the drawing brings the inferior candidate and the ￿rm rejects the
employment, the ￿rm expects to pay ￿ over an additional period. Therefore,
￿rms will accept the ￿rst applicant for work as long as extra costs of rejection
are equal to the extra gain through employing a superior worker. In this
case, the expected value of a vacancy is zero because waiting is worthless.











This is the condition for a pooling equilibrium in which vacancies are open to
both younger and older job seekers. Market tightness is the only parameter
that is variable, and it guarantees the identity of eq. (13). Rearranging




￿ ￿ wo + p￿
￿ (r + s + ￿o)
(14)
The vacancy-matching ratio 1=ql(￿) is an indicator of local job creation.
Firms open more vacancies if 1=ql (￿) increases. It is obvious that easy
11search and high pro￿ts foster job creation. Age-related separation and pro-
ductivity di⁄erences have clear e⁄ects on job creation. In addition, we see
that if the number of on-the-job searchers increases, either from the local or
from the neighbor region, this also increases job creation. This is caused by
a reduction of search costs. In addition, job creation could decrease if aging
happens in the surrounding area. This is because of the negative regional
mobility e⁄ect of aging in the surrounding area. This e⁄ect is independent
from the productivity and separation di⁄erences of older and younger work-
ers. Hence, it is possible that ￿rms favor older workers, but the overall
e⁄ect of aging is negative if aging happens in the local and the neighbor
region. In this case, the positive e⁄ect of the employment characteristics
of older workers will be outweighed by the e⁄ect of a decreasing number of
applicants.
Steady state equilibrium on the local labor market satis￿es the ￿ ow
equilibrium (2), the job creation condition (14), and the two wage equations
(9) and (10). Job creation and the wage equations yield market tightness.
Together with the BC equilibrium unemployment is ￿xed.
2.2 E⁄ects of Aging
The aging of the labor force a⁄ects local equilibrium unemployment if older
and younger workers di⁄er in the considered attributes, and if it a⁄ects
the number of regional mobile job seekers. Hence, next we analyze the
comparative static e⁄ects of a change in the share of younger workers (p) on
equilibrium in the local labor market. We do not assume that younger or
older people in local and neighbor regions are di⁄erent in their employment
characteristics. Moreover, we are particularly interested in the di⁄erences
between the younger and older workers who supply labor to the local labor
market.
From the job creation condition it follows that the market tightness










(Jy ￿ Jo). (15)
The willingness to create a vacancy, 1=ql (￿), decreases (increases) due to
a fall in p if Jy > Jo (Jy < Jo). The age structure has no e⁄ect on job
creation under the assumption that Jy = Jo. This means that di⁄erent age-
related e⁄ects, such as the separation risk and the productivity di⁄erential,
cancel each other out. The regional mobility of job applicants can mitigate
or amplify age e⁄ects on the local labor market.
We expect that aging in the surrounding area a⁄ects the local BC to a
lesser extent because it a⁄ects merely a part of the local exit probability. The
local age proportion of younger workers changes the local BC of equation

































We assume that @qn=@pl > 0, because aging a⁄ects regional mobility
negatively. From this, it follows that the second term is always positive.
Hence, @ul=@pl < 0 if ul
y < ul
o.10 The overall e⁄ect is ambiguous if ul
y > ul
o.
That is, a decline in the share of older people reduces equilibrium unem-
ployment if, for example, older people have a higher age-speci￿c separation
rate. Relative to aging, this means that an increase in the share of older
people increases the average ￿ ow in the labor market. It follows from the
matching technology that given a constant rate of job creation, higher total
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Figure 1: The e⁄ects of aging on the local search equilibrium
Figure 1 shows equilibrium in the vacancy-unemployment space and il-
lustrates the e⁄ects that can arise if the age structure in￿ uences ￿ ows in the
labor market and job creation. The steady state condition for unemployment
is the BC, which is convex to the origin by the properties of the matching
technology. As usual, the BC is downward sloping. Unemployment is low
if the vacancy rate is high because job seekers ￿nd new employment easily.
The JC is the curve that maps the job creation condition. It has a positive






13intercept ((el+un+en)￿l) and shifts when the number of employed job seek-
ers or the number of unemployed in the surrounding area changes. Firms
prefer a large pool of job seekers because it is easy for them to ￿nd appropri-
ate candidates for their vacancies and thus save search costs. Hence, ￿rms
create more jobs if local unemployment is high (for a given intercept of the
JC) and the JC slopes upwards.
Taking the central equilibrium as a starting point, four di⁄erent out-
comes may occur if the ratio of younger to older workers decreases.11 The
results are henceforth denoted as regime (1) to (4). In regime (1), older work-
ers increase the mean separation risk and due to an unfavorable productivity-
wage ratio, they are less preferred by the ￿rms. A growing share of older
workers then implies that the BC shifts outwards and the JC rotates clock-
wise. The result is that unemployment increases clearly, but the e⁄ect on the
vacancy rate is ambiguous. Regime (2) implies that ￿rms still prefer younger
workers, the number of which becomes fewer. However, older workers re-
duce labor turnover and the BC consequently shifts inwards. From this, it
follows that fewer vacant jobs are available, but it is not clear whether this
leads to higher unemployment as fewer job-worker matches are terminated
and fewer people look for reemployment.
Unemployment decreases if the reduced labor turnover is combined with
a favorable productivity-wage ratio of older workers. This takes place in
regime (3). Finally, ￿rms can intensify job creation because older employees
are superior workers, but it is not clear whether this reduces unemployment
if older workers have a high separation risk. The resulting increase in labor
turnover is accompanied by more vacancies, but the total employment e⁄ect
in regime (4) is ambiguous.
We now turn to the e⁄ects of regional interactions. Spatial interactions
of regional labor markets can cause the regimes on a local labor market
as well. The JC rotates clockwise if the number of mobile job searchers
in the surrounding areas decreases, because this increases search costs for
￿rms and this, in turn, decreases the number of vacancies as well as market
tightness.12 With respect to unemployment, the e⁄ect is ambiguous because
the reemployment probability of the local unemployed people could increase
and this shifts the BC inwards. However, according to Pissarides (2000),
the overall e⁄ect on unemployment is expected to be positive because the
market tightness e⁄ect dominates the BC e⁄ect.
For the sake of simplicity, we assumed in the model that only pro-
ductivity di⁄erential, age-related separation risks, and mobility distinguish
younger from older workers. However, no general e⁄ect is lost by this sim-
pli￿cation. This is because other age-related heterogeneity also a⁄ects equi-
11We analyze the case of a decrease in p because this occurs in the last years and will
take place in the coming years.
12In addition, the intercept also decreases in this case.
14librium, either through changes in labor turnover or through changes in the
value of a job-worker match. For example, one could think of age-related
search intensities which a⁄ect reemployment probabilities and age-speci￿c
unemployment rates. Other examples would be ￿rm-speci￿c human capital
or seniority, which could give older workers higher bargaining power or dif-
ferences in the discount rates if younger workers value career progression in
a job higher than the current salary. Moreover, one could argue that ￿ is
a discrimination factor, which is positive if ￿rms discriminate against older
workers. In the case that employers prefer younger workers, because of prej-
udices or bad experiences with older employees, they may add an extra value
to the observable productivity of the young.
The consequences of these examples would be a di⁄erential between Jo
and Jy, which results in more or less job creation if the age structure changes.
Hence, more age-related heterogeneity could be captured, but the considered
e⁄ects represent the general impact of the age-structure, and the distinction
between the four regimes remains untouched by di⁄erent extensions of the
model.
3 Empirical Analysis
As shown in the previous section, age-related changes in job destruction
and job creation consider dynamics ignored by, for example, the simple
shift-share approach, which uses the general fact that young workers have
higher unemployment rates than old workers. In this section, we therefore
investigate empirically whether aging of the labor force a⁄ects regional un-
employment in Germany according to the results of the theoretical model,
using dynamic econometric speci￿cations. Moreover, we analyze whether
spatial interactions of regional labor markets, particularly the age structure,
can explain regional unemployment rates.
In order to capture changes in age-composition, we divide the labor force
(analogous to the theoretical model) into young, p, and old, (1 ￿ p). We use a
broader de￿nition of young and old workers than most other studies, because
we believe that many individual characteristics relevant for job creation and
job destruction, such as quit rates and productivity changes, alter when
workers are of middle age.13 Hence, we label workers as young when they
are between 15 and 39 years old, and old when their age is between 40 and
64 years.
To account for the age structure of the job seekers (which is unknown),
we use the age distribution of the labor force. That is, we assume that the
share of younger job seekers is equal to the share of the younger ones in the
13For example, B￿rsch-Supan (2003) shows that the typical age-productivity pro￿le
peaks mostly when workers are in their 40s. The Federal Institute for Employment Re-
search in Germany comes to the same conclusion.
15labor force. This is because we have no information about the age structure
of the on-the-job searchers.14 As mentioned in the introduction, the ratio of
young to old workers (15 to 39 years old to those between 40 and 64 years
old) ranged between 1.5 and 0.6 at the regional level in Germany in 2000 and
2001. Figure 2 shows the ratio of the age groups (left scale) in relation to
the unemployment rates at the regional level for 343 districts and monthly
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Figure 2: Unemployment and aging in Germany at the regional level
According to the data, aging approximated by the ratio of young to old
workers is associated with higher unemployment at the regional level (r =
￿0:71). Moreover, the statistical relationship seems to be convex. According
to Hetze and Ochsen (2006), who analyze aggregated time series data for
Germany, periods of quasi-full employment have high and non-systematic
variations in the age composition of the unemployed, but in times of high
unemployment rates, even business cycle e⁄ects do not alter signi￿cantly the
distribution of unemployment by age. The data depicted in ￿gure 2 seem to
be in line with this ￿nding, although they represent primarily cross-section
units and refer to the labor force. Hence, time series and cross-sectional
data for Germany are related to a stable statistical relation between regional
14However, it should be mentioned that this share can be underestimated. On the one
hand, younger workers exhibit higher unemployment rates but older workers have larger
birth cohorts. Hence, it is not known if the unemployed are, on average, younger or older
than the labor force. On the other hand, on-the-job search decreases with age, and we
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Figure 3: Market tightness, vacancies, and aging
unemployment rates and the ratio of young to old workers.
With respect to the causal relationship, both directions are possible. In
the supply side e⁄ect, young people move into regions with comparatively
low unemployment rates, which in turn, foster aging in regions with high
unemployment rates. In the demand side e⁄ect, ￿rms could prefer younger
workers, and in regions with a larger share of older workers, not only is
job destruction higher, but the unemployment rate is higher as well. One
drawback of the supply side e⁄ect is that it balances regional unemployment
rates to a certain extent. In addition, this e⁄ect becomes unimportant at the
aggregate level, given international net migration of the young is negligible.
Hetze and Ochsen (2006) use macro data to analyze the demand e⁄ects of
aging on unemployment and ￿nd a strong signi￿cant positive e⁄ect. To
isolate the demand side e⁄ect in our data, we use an instrumental variable
estimator.
We have shown in the theoretical section that the vacancy-matching ra-
tio 1=ql can be interpreted as an indicator of job creation. Firms open more
vacancies for a given number of job seekers if 1=ql increases. Since ql de-
pends on market tightness, we use ￿l as a proxy for job creation, because
ql is unknown. The vacancy rate is not an appropriate proxy for job cre-
ation, since job creation is conditional on job seekers. Firms respond to the
unemployment rate and labor turnover with a certain quantity of new jobs.
The statistical relationship between the ratio of the age groups (left scale)
and the log of market tightness is depicted in the left-hand side of ￿gure
3. According to the data, aging and market tightness are positively related
(r = 0:49). This e⁄ect is driven not only by the unemployment rate as the
right-hand side scatter diagram of ￿gure 3 shows. Here, the relationship be-
tween the ratio of the age groups and the log of vacancy rate is also positive
(r = 0:33). Moreover, the ￿gures reveal a very similar pattern.
Figures 2 and 3 provide empirical evidence that aging can in fact a⁄ect
17employment. At this stage, however, the ￿gures are not more than an in-
teresting observation, since the dependent variables are not conditional on
wages, skills, etc. However, with respect to the four regimes in the theoret-
ical section of this paper, our regional data for Germany do not seem not
to allow the same conclusion as the macro data for Germany used in Hetze
and Ochsen (2006). They conclude for the German labor market that job
destruction increases with aging, and job creation also increases with the
share of older workers. This combination of opposing e⁄ects yields regime
(4). According to our data, however, job creation seems to decrease with
aging. With respect to the theoretical model in section 2, this means that
the German labor market falls into the category of regime (1). In this case,
the overall e⁄ects of aging on unemployment are unambiguously positive.
In Hetze and Ochsen (2006), only the net e⁄ect was positive. However, a
reliable answer can only be given based on appropriate estimates.
Figure 4 about here
To illustrate the distribution of unemployment and age at the regional
level in Germany, we use the monthly data for September 2001 to map the
343 regions. Figure 4 shows the regional unemployment rates using dark
blue for regions with high unemployment and light blue for regions with low
unemployment. Unemployment is high in Eastern Germany and compar-
atively low in Southern Germany. In addition, we see, on average, that if
the local region exhibits a high unemployment rate, then this applies to the
neighbor regions as well. Hence, the age-related regional mobility e⁄ect from
the surrounding areas may explain the di⁄erence between identi￿ed regimes
(1) and (4), because a macro data approach would mix the two e⁄ects.
Figure 5 shows the ratio of young to old workers in the labor force for
September 2001 in the 343 regions. In the dark blue regions, the ratio of
young to old workers is high, while it is low in the light blue areas. Com-
pared with the unemployment rates, we see for the age group ratio almost
a reversed pattern in terms of color. On average, the labor force is conspic-
uously older in Eastern Germany. In contrast to the unemployment rate
pattern, the south does not di⁄er from Midwestern Germany. Summarized,
both maps suggest a strong statistical relationship between aging of the
labor force and the level of unemployment at the regional level in Germany.
Figure 5 about here
3.1 Data
The period considered in this paper covers the years 2000 and 2001, and
the data are disaggregated to 343 regions (266 in Western Germany and
76 in Eastern Germany) with a monthly frequency. The decision for this
short time span may be explained by di⁄erent reasons. First, vacancies were
18available at this disaggregation level since January 1998. Second, in 1998
and 1999, some regional borders changed, and the economic indicators are
not comparable before and after this change. Third, in January 2003, the
labor market reforms (so-called Hartz Reformen) took e⁄ect, which makes
a comparison before and after the reforms di¢ cult. In addition, the reform
process has 4 stages and has taken 3 years. Fourth, in the years consid-
ered, the regional GDP growth rates are positive, while in 2002 and 2003,
most regions experienced a recession. Finally, in 2000, the European Union
started an investment program that particularly a⁄ected regions in Eastern
German.
An important advantage over the international and time series based
study by Hetze and Ochsen (2006) is that labor market institutions cannot
account for regional di⁄erences because they are set at the macro level and
remained unchanged in 2000 and 2001. In addition, business cycles are
negligible because the economic conditions are fairly stable in these two
years. This is important because at the beginning of a recession, it is often
observed that younger people are more often laid o⁄ than are older workers.
Furthermore, the vacancy rate is sensitive to ￿ uctuations in the business
cycle.15
Our proxy for p is the share of employed plus unemployed between 15 and
39 years old. In principle, this variable should capture the di⁄erences in the
value of a match with a younger or older worker that stems from a change in
age composition. The ￿rst instance refers to ￿y;￿o and ￿; however, if trade
unions have di⁄erent bargaining strategies relative to the age groups or the
discount rate is di⁄erent for the two age groups, this will be captured by p
as well. Furthermore, income during unemployment can have components
in addition to unemployment bene￿ts that may be di⁄erent for younger and
older job seekers. This means that p controls for unobserved heterogeneity
in the econometric model, which comes from a changed proportion of young
workers.
To identify the e⁄ect of the distribution of the labor force by age on job
creation and job destruction, we estimate the core equations in section 2, the
BC and the JC. While the BC is estimated several times in the literature,
the JC is exceedingly di¢ cult to identify. Our approach to generalize job
creation is given in equation (14), which indicates that the vacancy-matching
ratio, ql ￿
￿l;pn￿
, is an indicator of job creation. An increase in this ratio
means that ￿rms open more vacancies if the number of job seekers increases.
Hence, we chose ￿l as a proxy for job creation. The age distribution in the
neighbor district will be considered on the right-hand side of the equation.
The data used are taken from the Federal Statistical O¢ ce and the
Federal Institute for Employment Research in Germany. The number of
15See, for example, Davis et al. (1996) for a detailed discussion of the cyclical behavior
of job creation and destruction.
19employed (E) and unemployed (U) are taken from the Federal Statistical
O¢ ce, while the data for the vacancies (V ) are taken from the Federal
Institute for Employment Research. These data are used to calculate the
unemployment rate (U=(E + U)) and vacancy rate (V=(E + U)). Both
rates have the same denominator, which is necessary for an appropriate
representation of the BC. The share of on-the-job searchers (e) is unknown
at the regional level. According to the Federal Statistical O¢ ce, the on-the-
job seeker rate is about 10% at the macro level. We use this rough number
to calculate the number of on-the-job seekers at the regional level. From
this, it follows that market tightness is not accurately approximated, and
this must be considered when we interpret the results. A second reason for
this inaccuracy is related to underreporting of vacancies to the agencies of
the Federal Employment O¢ ce.
We merge these data with variables taken from the IAB employment
sample (IABS). This panel contains information on the course of employ-
ment and unemployment, and the individual sociodemographic characteris-
tics of more than 1 million individuals. We aggregate the individual informa-
tion to the regional level of 343 districts. The sociodemographic characteris-
tics of the individuals, which serve as control variables, address information
about age, education, employment status, wages, and employment classi￿-
cation according to the economic sectors. Education is subdivided into three
groups: low educated (those who have no vocational education), medium ed-
ucated (those who have a vocational education), and high educated (those
who have an academic degree). In the estimates, we use the low educated as
a reference group. Wages are considered as relative age wages and relative
education wages. The former is calculated as the average daily income of
people 40 years and older divided by the average daily income of those who
are less than 40 years old. The latter is calculated as the ratio of the average
daily income of low educated to high educated workers. In both cases, we
consider only those who were employed full time. The number of employed is
subdivided into three groups: full-time employed, part-time employed, and
petty job worker. All three groups are considered as shares. In addition,
we subdivide the full-time employed into two groups based on wages. The
share of low wage earners is determined by those who earn less than 100 e
a day, and the rest of the full-time employed where pooled into high wage
earner. Finally, to control for di⁄erences in regional economic activities, we
consider eight di⁄erent sectors, weighted by employment shares.16
Our main interest lies in the e⁄ect of aging and in the spatial inter-
action of local labor markets. Hence, we will focus on these data in the
empirical section. The control variables comprise on-the-job search and the
16A: Energy, agriculture, and mining; B: raw/basic materials and goods; C:
manufacturing-industrial goods; D: manufacturing-consumption goods; E: construction;
F: trade; G: transport and communication; H: services.
20data generated based on the sociodemographic variables in the local and
the neighbor region. In order to generate spatially lagged counterparts, we
construct a spatial weight matrix indicating the contiguity of regions. We
de￿ne contiguity between two regions as regions sharing a common bor-
der. The corresponding spatial weight matrix W is therefore a symmetric
343 ￿ 343 matrix. W is row normalized, which ensures that all weights are
between 0 and 1, and weighting operations can be interpreted as an average
of the neighboring values. For example, WUt gives the average number of
unemployed in the regions that share the border with the local region.
3.2 Econometric Models
In order to estimate precisely the e⁄ects of interest and given the limited
data availability, the econometric models should be as compatible as pos-
sible with the theoretical model. The theoretical model does not consider
explicitly unemployed people and vacant jobs, respectively, which exist for
more than one period. Therefore, we account for the path dependence of
both the unemployment rate and market tightness. In contrast to the stan-
dard hysteresis model of unemployment, we also consider the spatial lagged
and space-time lagged unemployment rates. For the JC, we include market
tightness in the same way.
That is, in addition to the simple time lagged dependent variable, we
calculate the spatial lagged and space-time lagged dependent variables as
follows: W ~ ut, with ~ ut = log (ut), is the spatial unemployment rate (in loga-
rithm) in time t, W ~ ut￿1 is the spatial unemployment rate (in logarithm) in
time t ￿ 1. With respect to market tightness, we use the same procedure.
We use these spatial lagged and space-time lagged variables as explanatory
variables: log(ujt), log(ujt￿1), log(￿jt), and log(￿jt￿1).
To account for additional spatial interactions, we additionally calculate
for some control variables Xt the average neighborhood value WXt. That
is, we consider the age, skill, and wage composition in the surrounding areas
as well. With respect to the BC, we follow the modeling in the theoretical
part and control for vacant jobs in the local and neighbor regions. Hence,
the vacancy rates will be treated in the same way as the X variables, and
enter eq. (18) as log(vit) and log(vjt), while the latter is calculated using
the spatial weight matrix.
The considered econometric methods can be subdivided into two classes.
The ￿rst class of estimation techniques consists of standard methods that
account for the dynamic e⁄ects of the unemployment rate and market tight-
ness in a naive manner. The ￿rst model is a simple pool estimator (Pool)
that accounts for time e⁄ects, while the second one is a standard ￿xed e⁄ects
model (FE) that also accounts for time e⁄ects. In contrast to the second
model, the third uses Driscoll and Kraay standard errors (FE(DC)). Driscoll
and Kraay (1998) argue that spatial correlations among cross-sections may
21arise for a number of reasons, ranging from observed common shocks, such
as terms of trade or oil shocks, to unobserved contagion or neighborhood
e⁄ects.17 Building on the non-parametric heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent covariance matrix estimation technique, they show how
this approach can be extended to a panel setting with cross-sectional depen-
dence.
Although we are principally interested in age e⁄ects, we consider an
alternative approach, because the spatial and time dynamic e⁄ects of the
dependent variable are biased in the considered methods.18 Hence, in the
second class of estimation techniques, we use a spatial and time dynamic
data approach with both regional and time ￿xed e⁄ects as suggested by
Lee and Yu (2007) and Yu et al. (2008). In this case, the parameters
for the time lagged, spatial lagged, and space-time lagged values of the
dependent variables will be estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood
estimator that is extended by a bias correction. To avoid biased estimates for
the lagged e⁄ects of the dependent variables, Lee and Yu (2007) developed
a data transformation approach that has the same asymptotic e¢ ciency as
the quasi-maximum likelihood estimator when n is not relatively smaller
than T.19 Hence, the fourth model is an unbiased spatial and time dynamic
panel data model with both regional and time ￿xed e⁄ects (STDFE).
The models have the following general speci￿cation:
Ynt = ￿0Yn;t￿1+￿0WnYnt+￿0WnYn;t￿1+Xnt￿0+cn0+￿t0ln+Vnt (17)
where Ynt = (y1t;y2t;:::;ynt) ￿ and Vnt = (v1t;v2t;:::;vnt) ￿ are n ￿ 1
column vectors and vit is i.i.d. across i and t with zero mean and variance ￿2
0.
Wn is an n￿n spatial weights matrix which is nonstochastic and generates
the spatial dependence between cross sectional units yit, Xnt is an n ￿ kx
matrix of nonstochastic regressors, cn0 is n ￿ 1 column vector of individual
￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t0 is a scalar of time e⁄ect and ln is n ￿ 1 column vector of
ones. Wn is row normalized from a symmetric matrix, which ensures that
all weights are between 0 and 1, and weighting operations can be interpreted
as an average of the neighboring values.
This general speci￿cation will be applied to both the BC and the JC as
discussed above. To make the e⁄ects of interest more visible, we provide the
17According to Driscoll and Kraay (1998), the presence of such spatial correlations in
residuals complicates standard inference procedures that combine time-series and cross-
sectional data since these techniques typically require the assumption that the cross-
sectional units are independent. When this assumption is violated, estimates of standard
errors are inconsistent, and hence are not useful for inference.
18See, for example, Nickell (1981) with respect to the asymptotic bias of OLS estimation
using the time lagged e⁄ect and, for example, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) for biased OLS
estimates when spatial lagged e⁄ects are considered.
19With respect to our data, for which we have T relatively smaller than n, Lee and
Yu (2007) show that the estimator is consistent with rate T and has a degenerate limit
distribution.
22two equations in an alternative notation:
log(uit) = ￿0 + ￿1 log(uit￿1) + ￿2 log(ujt) + ￿3 log(ujt￿1) (18)
+￿4 log(vit) + ￿5 log(vjt) + ￿6 (1 ￿ pit) + ￿7 (1 ￿ pjt)
+￿0Xit + ￿0Xjt + ’i +  t + ￿1it
log(￿it) = ￿0 + ￿1 log(￿it￿1) + ￿2 log(￿jt) + ￿3 log(￿jt￿1) (19)
+￿4 (1 ￿ pit) + ￿5 (1 ￿ pjt)
+￿0Xit + !0Xjt + ’i +  t + ￿2it
In both equations, ’i and  t are regional and time ￿xed e⁄ects, and ￿ is an
error term. The estimated e⁄ects of the age composition, ￿6;￿7;￿4; and ￿5,
reveal how unemployment changes due to shifts of and moves on the BC.
Furthermore, they identify the regime according to ￿gure 1. For the ￿rst
speci￿cation (Pool) we assume that ’i = 0.
According to the speci￿cations used, we consider the e⁄ects of aging on
local ￿rm decisions. As mentioned above, however, particularly the young
people in the labor force could gravitate to employment rates in other re-
gions. Hence, it is possible that the aging parameters in the BC and the JC
su⁄er from a simultaneous equation bias. On this account, we run additional
regressions and instrument the share of older people in the labor force by the
one period lagged share. We estimate both equations with an instrumental
variable (IV) estimator using the pool and the ￿xed e⁄ects IV models. In
a second step, we substitute the share of older people in the labor force by
its time lagged value. This model speci￿cation will be estimated with all
four considered econometric methods discussed in this section and will be
referred to as pseudo IV approach.
For the 24 months and 343 regions considered, we have 8,232 observa-
tions. However, due to the inclusion of time lagged e⁄ects, we lose 1 month
and therefore have 7,889 observations available for the estimates. For the
IV and pseudo IV estimates we lose no further observations, because we use
the lost ￿rst cross section observation as instrument for the ￿rst month in
the estimates.
3.3 Results
This section is organized as follows: We ￿rst discus the panel estimates
without instrumenting the aging variable. The main results are provided in
tables 1 and 2. Afterwards, we discuss the results of the panel IV estimates
that are presented in table 3, whereas we focus henceforth only on age e⁄ects.
Finally, the age e⁄ects using the pseudo IV approach are provided in table
4.
Table 1 shows the results for the BC in which the log of the unemploy-
ment rate is the dependent variable. Although the theoretical model does
23not consider explicitly a time lagged dependent variable, we can conclude
that the path dependent e⁄ect is de￿nitely positive. According to the theo-
retical model, the spatial lagged unemployment rate has a positive e⁄ect on
the local unemployment rate. In fact, both time and spatial lagged unem-
ployment rates have a positive e⁄ect in all speci￿cations provided in table
1. However, with respect to the magnitude of the lagged e⁄ects, only the
results for equation (4) are unbiased. The space-time lagged e⁄ect of the
unemployment rate, however, has an unexpected signi￿cant negative sign.
Our conclusion is that this variable is nearly perfectly correlated with the
time and spatial lagged unemployment rates, and this, in turn, a⁄ects the
sign of the parameter.20 An indicator of this conclusion is the variance-
in￿ ation-factor for this variable, which is 325.
The local vacancy rate has the expected negative e⁄ect, which is in
accordance with the theory. More precisely, the corresponding parameter
is the slope of the local BC. The estimated parameter for the curvature of
the BC, however, is very small. In contrast to the local e⁄ect, the spatial
lagged vacancy rate has no signi￿cant e⁄ect. Both the small local e⁄ect
and the insigni￿cant spatial lagged e⁄ect can result from under-reporting of
vacancies to the local agencies of the Federal Employment O¢ ce. Hence,
the estimated parameters should be interpreted rather as an approximation.
On this account, we should be careful in concluding that there is no spatial
interaction regarding the job ￿nding rate.
With respect to the interpretation of the on-the-job search e⁄ects, we
must bear in mind that vacancies are kept constant. The e⁄ect of an increase
in local on-the-job search on the local BC is negative. That is, according to
this e⁄ect, the BC shifts inwards when on-the-job search increases. This is
in line with the conclusions based on the standard on-the-job search model,
whereupon unemployment unambiguously decreases with higher on-the-job
search. An increase in on-the-job search due to lower search costs, for ex-
ample, increases the number of matches for a given number of vacant jobs.
Related to the standard Pissarides on-the-job search model, we can argue
additionally that the reservation productivity decreases and this, in turn,
reduces job destruction. In both cases, the BC shifts inwards. The spatial
on-the-job search e⁄ect is positive and, hence, shifts the local BC outwards.
On the one hand, it is possible that higher local on-the-job search is lead-
ing to higher labor turnover and this, in turn, yields, on average, better
matches. An increase in on-the-job search in the surrounding area will not
cause such an e⁄ect on the local labor market, and this may lead to an
outward shift of the local BC. In this case, the crowding-out e⁄ect on the
local unemployed prevail. Another argument is that, given that younger job
seekers have higher regional mobility than do older job seekers, the overall
20See, for example, Greene (2008) for a remark that high collinearity between the X
variables can cause a change of sign.
24supply of younger job searchers in the local labor market increases. Since
the average unemployment period for younger people is shorter, this means
that they ￿nd new jobs more easily. This is to the disadvantage of older
workers resident in the local labor market; thus, the local BC shifts out-
wards because of the longer unemployment spell of older workers. Hence,
employment shocks in the neighbor regions decrease the probability to ￿nd
a new job for the local older unemployed.
The local older labor force is positively related to the unemployment
rate, which means that job destruction is higher in regions with a larger
share of older people in the labor force. However, the e⁄ect is statistically
weak in the favored model (4). For the share of older workers in the sur-
rounding labor market, we ￿nd a similar e⁄ect, which is signi￿cant only
in the case when spatial correlation is considered in the calculation of the
standard errors. The statistically less important spatial age e⁄ect can be
explained by a combination of two e⁄ects. First, as mentioned in the be-
ginning of the second part of this paper, about 50% of the employed are
regional mobile. Hence, the age structure in the spatial areas is of impor-
tance, but to a lesser extent than the local age structure. Second, given that
younger people are more mobile than older people, aging reduces the share
of regional mobile workers which, in turn, decreases the spatial age e⁄ect on
local unemployment.21 Another reason for the insu¢ cient signi￿cance level
of this e⁄ect is that it a⁄ects the local BC merely through one of the two exit
probabilities. Summing up, according to the age e⁄ects on job destruction
in the theoretical section, regime (1) and regime (4) remain relevant.
Table 1 about here
With respect to the control variables for educational di⁄erences, we ￿nd
no signi￿cant e⁄ects. That is to say, according to our data, job destruction
at the regional level is not driven by the education mix of the labor force in
Germany. The distribution of full-time, part-time, and petty job employed
a⁄ects job destruction only with respect to the share of petty job workers.
According to models (2) to (4) in table 1, there is a signi￿cant positive
relationship between the share of petty jobs and job destruction. This e⁄ect
is as expected, because these jobs have, on average, a higher job turnover
rate, which in turn, shifts the BC outwards.
In table 2, we provide the results for JC. As in the BC estimates, the time
lagged e⁄ect of the dependent variable is as expected and, hence, for JC,
a path dependence exists as well. However, as mentioned for the previous
table, the lagged e⁄ects of the dependent variable are estimated unbiased
only in equation (4). With respect to the spatial lagged e⁄ect, we would
argue according to the theoretical model as follows: An increase in on-the-
job search in either of the two regions (local or spatial) decreases the search
21See, again, footnote 6.
25costs of the ￿rms in both regions, if the job seekers apply for jobs in both
regions. The search cost e⁄ect, in turn, increases market tightness in both
regions.22 Alternatively, one could argue that an increase of vacancies in
the neighbor district for other reasons than on-the-job search decreases the
unemployment rate in this labor market (as we have seen in table 1 the local
labor markets have a stable BC). Because of the spatial interaction of the exit
rates, this applies as well, to some extent, to the local unemployment rate.
In turn, this increases the tightness of the local labor market. The spatial
lagged e⁄ect in table 2 is in accordance with the theoretical explanations,
while the space-time lagged e⁄ect has an opposing sign and is therefore not
in accordance with the theory. However, the variance-in￿ ation-factor for
the space-time lagged variable is 48. Hence, it seems that the corresponding
parameter su⁄ers from a switch of the sign due to multicollinearity, as is the
case in the BC estimates.
The spatial lagged wage ratio for old to young workers has a signi￿cant
positive e⁄ect on local job creation. It does not seem plausible to assume
that this e⁄ect re￿ ects productivity di⁄erences between younger and older
workers, because the corresponding local e⁄ect is not signi￿cant. Rather,
it seems the relative lower the wages are for younger workers in the sur-
rounding areas, the more often they apply for jobs in the local region. This
wage-driven spatial mobility of younger workers has a positive e⁄ect on job
creation in the local labor market. Another cautious conclusion is that pro-
ductivity di⁄erences between younger and older workers seem to be small,
on average. However, wages do not re￿ ect age-related productivity di⁄er-
ences correctly if earnings increase with age more than productivity grows.23
With respect to the wage ratio of low educated to high educated, we ￿nd no
signi￿cant e⁄ect.
The two aging e⁄ects are opposing on JC in the local labor market, ex-
cept for the pool speci￿cation. The signi￿cance level, however, is somewhat
ambiguous for both variables. If we consider the unbiased dynamic panel
estimator (4) as the favored estimation, aging on the local labor market
increases job creation (regime (4)), while aging in the neighbor districts de-
creases local job creation (regime (1)). The ￿rst result is in line with the
￿ndings of Hetze and Ochsen (2006) for Germany, according to which this is
an indication of higher productivity among older workers. The second result
means that the higher the number of younger job seekers in the neighbor
district, the more jobs will be created in the local labor market.
This second spatial aging e⁄ect does not mean that the productivity
di⁄erential between younger and older workers is reversed. A worker from
the surrounding area, who is employed in the local region, will be considered
22See, for example, Pissarides (2000) for a detailed discussion.
23For empirical evidence of di⁄erences between the age-earnings pro￿le and the age-
productivity pro￿le, see for example, Lazear (1979) and Hutchens (1987, 1989).
26in the local e⁄ect. Put di⁄erently, it is not possible that the spatial region
will always have a higher productivity, because every region is a neighbor
and a local district. That is, the spatial age e⁄ect cannot be interpreted
as a productivity e⁄ect. Rather, the estimated e⁄ect re￿ ects the spatial
mobility of workers in the surrounding area. Since younger workers are
more mobile, this seems plausible. The outcome of this e⁄ect is comparable
to the standard on-the-job search e⁄ect on job creation. That is, the more
people demand new jobs, the lower the search costs for ￿rms; this, in turn,
increases job creation.
However, if this is the case, then why does the local labor supply yield
to an opposing e⁄ect? One explanation is that both younger and older
job seekers in the local labor market apply for vacant jobs in this region.
Hence, regional mobility no longer has any in￿ uence on job creation if aging
is restricted to the local area. This means that if aging happens in the local
and neighbor regions in a similar way, the overall number of job seekers is
reduced, which in turn, increases search costs and reduces job creation in
both regions due to the spatial interaction.
Table 2 about here
The supply of skills has a somewhat surprising e⁄ect on job creation. Ac-
cording to the results, an increase in the supply of medium educated people
to the disadvantage of the low educated reduces job creation. In addition,
the supply of high educated labor has no signi￿cant e⁄ect on job creation.
These results contradict those of the literature on the causes of regional
growth. However, the results are driven by East-West di⁄erences. We ran
additional regressions (not shown here) with separated East and West ef-
fects, and found a signi￿cant positive relation between education and job
creation for Western Germany. In addition, it seems that the classi￿cation
of education groups is insu¢ cient. The low educated are those who have
no vocational education. In some regions, the share of the labor force with
this education level is about 1%, and the mean is about 3.3% in Eastern
Germany, and 15.6% in Western Germany. This re￿ ects the di⁄erences in
the education systems of the former West and East German countries. How-
ever, not only is the formal education higher on average in the eastern part
of Germany, but so is the unemployment rate. Since education is only a
control variable in the context of this paper, we will not focus more on this
puzzle.
We now use the pool IV and ￿xed e⁄ects IV estimators to analyze how
much the simultaneous equation bias a⁄ects the estimated e⁄ects of the
aging variable. Table 3 provides estimates for both the BC and the JC. Re-
gressions (1) and (2) are related to the BC, while regressions (3) and (4) are
speci￿cations of the JC. According to the estimates, the simultaneous equa-
tion bias has decreased the parameters of the age e⁄ects in the ￿xed e⁄ects
27estimation of the BC. With respect to the JC, we derive the same result
for both estimates of the local e⁄ect, and the signi￿cant level has increased
in both equations. The spatial e⁄ect increases somewhat in magnitude in
the ￿xed e⁄ects IV estimation, and the e⁄ect is still signi￿cant at the 5%
level. According to the results, the local e⁄ects are now both signi￿cant and
positive. In addition, the spatial aging e⁄ect is signi￿cant for job creation.
Hence, the demand side driven causality seems to be of importance.
Table 3 about here
To consider all models in table 1 and 2, we now use the time lagged
share and the spatial time lagged share of the older labor force instead of
the actual and the spatial lagged share. Put di⁄erently, we employ a more
naive approach here, in which we impose the instruments directly, without
estimating two stages.24 Hence, the only di⁄erence between table 1 and the
upper part of table 4 is that in the latter, the aging proxies are time lagged
by one period. A comparison with the estimates in table 1 shows that, on
average, the estimated parameters increase if we use the time lagged values.
In addition, the signi￿cance level has increased in the favored model (4).
For job creation, we ￿nd the same results related to the local e⁄ect in
estimates (2) to (4), if we compare table 4 with table 2. The local aging e⁄ect
has increased in magnitude and is now signi￿cant at least at the 5% level
in regressions (2) to (4). With respect to the spatial e⁄ect, the parameters
in (2) to (4) have decreased, while the signi￿cance level has increased in
(2) and (4). The results in table 4 are in accordance with the IV estimates
provided in table 3, whereas the e⁄ects in the true panel IV estimates are
somewhat stronger. Hence, the pseudo IV results are very similar to the
usual IV estimates. With respect to the favored spatial and time dynamic
panel data estimates (4) as suggested by Lee and Yu (2007), we now get
signi￿cant parameters for the local as well as for the spatial aging e⁄ect on
both job creation and job destruction, which are signi￿cant at the 1% level
with one exception.
Table 4 about here
The age structure has e⁄ects on ￿ ows in the labor market and the ex-
pected value of a match between jobs and workers if the e⁄ects measured
by the share of older people in the labor force are di⁄erent from zero. We
￿nd that, in principle, the IV and pseudo IV estimates are similar to those
of the usual estimates. Hence, the general conclusions with respect to the
e⁄ects of aging do not change if we consider the IV estimates. In most cases,
however, the signi￿cance level increases.
24This does not yield e¢ cient standard errors, but allows for a comparison of all meth-
ods used.
28According to the results, aging in the local and surrounding labor mar-
kets shifts the BC outwards. However, the e⁄ect of the latter is statistically
weak. With respect to JC, we ￿nd opposing e⁄ects of aging. While the local
e⁄ect is positive, the spatial e⁄ect is negative and larger in magnitude. With
reference to the theoretical model in section 2, we therefore identify regime
(4) if we consider only the local e⁄ects and regime (1) if we also consider
the spatial e⁄ects of aging. In other words, if aging happens in the local and
the neighbor districts, the unemployment rate will unambiguously increase
in the local region. The results are not as so dramatically if aging happens
only in the local region.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, at the regional level, we examined the relationship between
the change in the age structure of the labor force according to demographic
change and unemployment using both a theoretical and an empirical model.
The modeling relates to search and matching in the labor market with on-
the-job search. We extended the framework by spatial interactions and by
age-speci￿c e⁄ects on job creation and job destruction. From a theoretical
perspective, the e⁄ect of an increasing share of older people in the labor force
on total unemployment is ambiguous and divides into four possible regimes.
Aging decreases unemployment if older workers bring more pro￿ts to the
￿rms because of a higher productivity and a lower separation risk (regime
3). However, unemployment increases with a higher proportion of older job
seekers if ￿rms prefer younger workers due to productivity and separation
di⁄erences (regime 1). Spatial interactions between neighborhood regions
are implemented in such a way that it a⁄ects both job creation and job
destruction in the local region. Hence, aging in the surrounding regions can
exacerbate or mitigate the e⁄ects that emerge within a local region, because
it a⁄ects the exit rate from local unemployment as well as the search costs
of local ￿rms.
In the empirical part, we examine the consequences of an aging labor
force on equilibrium unemployment in the local labor markets using monthly
data for 343 districts in German and the years 2000 and 2001. To discover
the e⁄ects, we estimated two equations: The Beveridge curve and the job
creation curve. We apply di⁄erent estimation techniques, including a dy-
namic panel data estimator suggested by Lee and Yu (2007). According to
the estimates, aging of the labor force indeed has e⁄ects on unemployment
at the regional level. Based on our proxy for aging, which is the share of
older people (40 to 64 years old) in the labor force, ongoing aging will cause
an increase in local job destruction. In addition, aging in the local labor
market increases job creation, while aging in the surrounding areas has a
negative e⁄ect on job creation in the local district. Summing up, the results
29imply that regional unemployment rates increase when the share of younger
job seekers continuously decreases in the local and the surrounding areas.
This applies particularly to the Eastern German regions, where aging of the
labor force happens area-wide.
Regime (1) is less advantageous than the others because it implies that
the demographic change is followed by a rise in unemployment. This poor
result can arise because of misleading policy interventions but also because
of individual behavior and preferences. Our interpretation with respect to
the Beveridge curve is that aging increases the average separation risk. For
job creation, we argue that ￿rms respond positively to the local share of
older workers because of productivity di⁄erences but negatively to the share
of older people in the neighbor district because of increasing search costs.
The opposing local e⁄ects of aging on job creation and job destruction
might be explained by the ambiguous outcome of early retirement schemes.25
On the one hand, there is more labor reallocation and job destruction. On
the other hand, ￿rms have the possibility to dismiss unproductive old work-
ers and to keep the highly productive ones. The early retired workers are
removed from the group of job candidates. This raises the search produc-
tivity and ￿rms are willing to create new jobs. But job creation bene￿ts
only arti￿cially from aging, and the positive e⁄ect will disappear as soon
as the early retirement programs phase-out. The surrounding area e⁄ect of
aging on job creation di⁄ers from the local e⁄ect because younger workers
are more mobile than are older workers. From this, it follows that regional
mobility of older people in the labor market must increase.
As politics turns away from early retirement schemes and increases in the
retirement age are implemented, future job destruction and job creation will
depend critically on the wage-productivity ratio of old workers. But severe
wage cuts for old workers would concern an increasing share of the aging
labor force. Hence, further quali￿cation and lifelong learning are of growing
importance for employment levels and the quality of job-worker matching.
However, to avoid negative employment e⁄ects because of the demo-
graphic change, more research is needed to determine the speci￿c causes.
If ￿rms favor young employees, one should expect that demographic ag-
ing means higher unemployment rates. The way policy should deal with
this outcome, though, is not yet clear. Higher average education can ex-
plain the advantage enjoyed by young workers in the past. Alternatively, a
poor productivity-wage ratio due to seniority wages or age discrimination
as well as higher employment protection for older workers can also be the
cause.26 In the ￿rst case, the e⁄ect of aging will disappear because future
25Alternatively, even if early retirement is not possible, the Beveridge curve shifts to
the right if the rate of retirement from employment is higher than the rate of retirement
from unemployment.
26Indeed, age discrimination seems to play some role in the dismissals and the
(re)employment of old workers. Johnson and Neumark (1997) provide evidence for the
30older workers; i.e., those presently in their middle age, are, on average, more
educated than actual older workers. If seniority wages are the reason, then
only changes in the wage pro￿le can stimulate job creation in an aging la-
bor force. Instead, a better information policy is necessary in case of age
discrimination. Finally, if labor market institutions, such as employment
protection, are the cause, it will be necessary to encourage more ￿ exibility
in employing older workers. However, this will be di¢ cult for policymakers,
because the share of older people (voters) is large and will increase steadily
in the coming decades. Nevertheless, improvements in these ￿elds could
move the labor market towards the superior regimes and thus prepare it for
demographic change.
Appendix
Wage Determination: Individual with attribute i can be younger i = y
or older i = o. Firms have information about the worker￿ s age but wages
follow from identical bargaining rules. Workers receive Wi ￿ Ui from a new
employment, whereas the ￿rm gets Ji. According to Nash bargaining the
wage satis￿es:




The ￿rst order condition is


















r + s + ￿i
: (22)
We use the equation in eq. (21) and have:
￿
Ji
r + s + ￿i
= (1 ￿ ￿)
Wi ￿ Ui
r + s + ￿i
: (23)
From this we see that the extra value received by a worker is a factor ￿=(1￿￿)
of the value which remains in the ￿rm:




Using the equation in (8), and substituting Ji for (11) and (12), yields:
wo = (1 ￿ ￿)rUo + ￿￿; (25)
USA, and Charness and Villeval (2007) ￿nd age discrimination in France.
31wy = (1 ￿ ￿)rUy + ￿ (￿ + ￿): (26)
Employed workers receive an income that lays between their reservation
wage indicated by rUi and the full surplus that an employment generates.
Both boundary values can be di⁄erent for older and younger workers.
From eq. (3) and eq. (4) we can see that ￿rms evaluate an employment
according to Jo = (￿ ￿ wo)=(r + s + ￿o) and Jy = (￿ + ￿ ￿ wy)=(r + s + ￿y).
This and (24) yields:
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; (27)
Wy ￿ Uy =
￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿ + ￿ ￿ wy
r + s + ￿y
: (28)
Finally, with (7) we have:
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r + s + ￿y
: (30)
From plugging eq. (29) into eq. (25) and eq. (30) into eq. (26) we get the
wage equation presented in the text:
wo =
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Figure 5: Ratio of young to old people in the labor force in Germany (Sep-
tember 2001)
37Table 1: Job Destruction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Pool FE FE(DC) STDFE
time lagged dependent variable 0.992z 0.792z 0.792z 0.860z
spatial lagged dependent variable 0.966z 0.962z 0.962z 0.742z
spatial and time lagged dependent variable -0.966z -0.768z -0.768z -0.656z
vacancies -0.004z -0.009z -0.009z -0.012z
spatial lagged vacancies 0.002] 0.003 0.003 -0.002
on the job searcher -0.001 -0.237z -0.237y -0.153z
spatial lagged on the job searcher -0.001 0.220z 0.220y 0.139z
reference: younger labor force (15 to 39 years old)
older labor force 0.035z 0.091z 0.091] 0.073]
spatial lagged older labor force 0.004 0.089 0.089y 0.124
reference: low educated
medium educated 0.009 0.089 0.089 0.086
high educated -0.010 0.093 0.093 0.053
spatial lagged medium educated -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 0.002
spatial lagged high educated -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.019
reference: high income full-time employed
low income full-time employed -0.015y -0.042 -0.042 -0.048
part-time employed -0.005 -0.016 -0.016 -0.035
petty job employed 0.031 0.101z 0.101z 0.094z
spatial lagged low income full-time employed 0.026z -0.021 -0.021 -0.060
spatial lagged part-time employed -0.026 -0.105 -0.105 -0.099
spatial lagged petty job employed 0.013 -0.043 -0.043 0.001
regional ￿xed e⁄ects X X X
time ￿xed e⁄ects X X X X
regional sector shares X X X X
R2 0.998 0.939 0.939
NOTE: Number of observations: 7889; Pool: no regional ￿xed or random e⁄ects, with
robust standard errors; FE: ￿xed e⁄ects with robust standard errors; FE(DC): ￿xed
e⁄ects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors; STDFE: spatial and time dynamic
￿xed e⁄ects; in equation (2) we have made the following tests: Breusch and Pagan LM
test for random e⁄ects: 57.81z, Pesaran￿ s test of cross section independence: 2.462z;
z = 1% level, y = 5% level, ] = 10% level.
38Table 2: Job Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Pool FE FE(DC) STDFE
time lagged dependent variable 0.927z 0.748z 0.748z 0.821z
spatial lagged dependent variable 0.238z 0.212z 0.212z 0.134z
spatial and time lagged dependent variable -0.202z -0.160z -0.160] -0.101z
wage ratio old to young -0.026 -0.005 -0.005 0.003
spatial lagged wage ratio old to young 0.007 0.192] 0.192y 0.165y
wage ratio high to low educated -0.043 -0.002 -0.002 0.004
spatial lagged wage ratio high to low educated -0.011 -0.004 -0.004 0.001
reference: younger labor force (15 to 39 years old)
older labor force -0.158y 0.404 0.404 0.437]
spatial lagged older labor force -0.149 -1.020y -1.020y -0.997y
reference: low educated
medium educated -0.047 -0.777y -0.777z -0.658]
high educated 0.093 -0.837 -0.837 -0.320
spatial lagged medium educated 0.006 -0.036 -0.036 -0.019
spatial lagged high educated -0.089 -0.040 -0.040 -0.052
regional ￿xed e⁄ects X X X
time ￿xed e⁄ects X X X X
regional sector shares X X X X
R2 0.950 0.921 0.921
NOTE: Number of observations: 7889; Pool: no regional ￿xed or random e⁄ects, with
robust standard errors; FE: ￿xed e⁄ects with robust standard errors; FE(DC): ￿xed
e⁄ects with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors; STDFE: spatial and time dynamic
￿xed e⁄ects; in equation (2) we have made the following tests: Breusch and Pagan LM
test for random e⁄ects: 9.52z, Pesaran￿ s test of cross section independence: 18.43z; z =
1% level, y = 5% level, ] = 10% level.
39Table 3: IV Estimates for Job Destruction and Job Creation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BC JC
Variables PoolIV FEIV PoolIV FEIV
reference: younger labor force (15 to 39 years old)
older labor force 0.037z 0.138z -0.147] 0.717z
spatial lagged older labor force 0.006 0.136 -0.149 -1.355y
NOTE: Number of observations: 7889; PoolIV: instrumental variable esti-
mates without regional ￿xed or random e⁄ects; FEIV: instrumental variable
estimates with ￿xed e⁄ects; z = 1% level, y = 5% level, ] = 10% level.
Table 4: Time Lagged Aging E⁄ects on JD and JC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables Pool FE FE(DC) STDFE
reference: younger labor force (15 to 39 years old)
job destruction
older labor force 0.036z 0.113z 0.113y 0.120z
spatial lagged older labor force 0.006 0.111 0.111y 0.143]
job creation
older labor force -0.144] 0.605y 0.605y 0.591z
spatial lagged older labor force -0.146 -1.199z -1.199 -1.138z
NOTE: Number of observations: 7889; Pool: no regional ￿xed or ran-
dom e⁄ects, with robust standard errors; FE: ￿xed e⁄ects with robust
standard errors; FE(DC): ￿xed e⁄ects with Driscoll and Kraay standard
errors; STDFE: spatial and time dynamic ￿xed e⁄ects; z = 1% level, y =
5% level, ] = 10% level.
40